In the early years of Xi Jinping’s war on corruption, the Chinese leader consolidated control over the world’s largest military by taking down powerful generals from rival factions and replacing them with allies and proteges loyal to himself.
A decade on, having given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a structural overhaul and stacked its top ranks with his own men, the supreme leader is still knee-deep in his seemingly endless struggle against graft and disloyalty.
And, like many strongman leaders in history, he is increasingly turning against his own handpicked loyalists.
Late last month, Xi purged one of his closest proteges in the military – a decades-old associate entrusted with instilling political loyalty in the PLA and vetting senior promotions.
Adm. Miao Hua, who sits on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the top command body chaired by Xi, has been suspended under investigation for “serious violations of discipline,” the Defense Ministry announced, using a common euphemism for corruption and disloyalty.
As the head of the CMC’s political work department, which oversees political indoctrination and personnel appointments, Miao is the most senior scalp in Xi’s latest military purge. Since last summer, more than a dozen high-ranking figures in China’s defense establishment have been ousted, including the last two defense ministers promoted to the CMC by Xi.
But none of them boast the kind of long-standing relationship Miao shared with the top leader, dating back decades to Xi’s early political career in the coastal province of Fujian.
The probe into Miao opens a new front in a widening purge that has raised questions over Xi’s ability to end systematic corruption in the military and enhance its combat readiness at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Over the past decade, Xi has overseen an ambitious transformation of the PLA into a “world class” fighting force that can rival the US military. A key goal of that modernization drive is to ensure China is ready to fight and win a war over Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island Beijing claims as its own.
But Miao’s downfall renews questions – raised during last summer’s purges – about how much confidence Xi has in his top generals who would be responsible for leading a war, said Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow at the Pentagon-funded National Defense University.
“If he fears that he has brought in people who are not unquestionably loyal to him or his agenda, that would be a huge problem.”
Experts say Xi’s purge of a longtime acolyte points to a familiar dilemma for autocrats, including his predecessor Mao Zedong: after eliminating political rivals, the supreme leader never stops looking for new threats to their absolute hold on power – including from their own close circle.
‘Obscene extent of corruption’
Miao’s history with Xi goes back three decades. The Fujian native served as a political officer in the former 31st Group Army from the 1980s to the early 2000s, when Xi was rising through the ranks as a local official to become the provincial governor of Fujian.
“According to credible sources, Xi regularly visited the 31st Group Army at the time” and is known to have had personal contacts with Miao, said James Char, a longtime PLA-watcher and research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
Miao’s military career took off soon after Xi came to power. In 2014, he received a major promotion to become the political commissar of the PLA Navy, making an unusual switch from a career in the Ground Force. Three years later, he was promoted again into the CMC, the apex of military power.
“We cannot find a more apodictic acolyte of Xi than Miao,” Char said. “If Miao is eventually indicted of graft, clearly Xi himself had not anticipated the obscene extent of corruption that exists among PLA elites.”
For the past 18 months, Xi’s cleanup had largely targeted officials connected to the procurement of weapons and the Rocket Force, which oversees China’s nuclear and conventional missiles. But Miao’s downfall signals a broadening of that crackdown into new sectors, such as political work – which Xi has described as the “lifeline” of the military – and the Navy.
“Wherever they look, I’m sure they will find issues and cases. It’s just a matter of which sector they pick,” Char said.
‘Loss of confidence’
The Defense Ministry has offered no details about the allegations against Miao.
As the chief political commissar of the PLA, Miao is tasked with ensuring its loyalty to the ruling Communist Party. He oversees promotions in the military, vetting key candidates for their political loyalty – a role he also held in the Navy.
In the past, such roles have offered fertile ground for graft, especially bribes for promotions. Miao’s predecessor, Gen. Zhang Yang, killed himself while under disciplinary investigation for bribery.
As the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China heats up, the PLA Navy has also seen a drastic increase in the procurement of warships and other weapons, providing ample opportunities for corruption, said Victor Shih, a political science professor at the University of San Diego.
But there could be another potential reason behind Miao’s downfall, Shih said, for “being too obvious in his attempt to foster a faction in the military.”
Xi has repeatedly warned against the forming of factions in both the party and the military. “Of course, the only person who is allowed to do that is Xi himself,” Shih added.
Miao is seen by some analysts as having recommended multiple associates in the Navy for promotions to key positions, including Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin and Defense Minister Dong Jun.
The announcement of Miao’s investigation came a day after the Financial Times reported that Dong had been placed under investigation for corruption, citing current and former US officials. The Defense Ministry dismissed the report as “sheer fabrication,” and days later, Dong made a public appearance at a security forum.
Wuthnow, the expert at the National Defense University, said what led to Miao’s downfall was a “loss of confidence,” but the reasons for that remain elusive.
In one scenario, Wuthnow said, Xi might have viewed Miao as becoming too powerful and independent, and wanted to uproot what he saw as a bastion of influence that he could not fully control.
“I don’t think this is how leaders who are confident in their own power and ability to corral the bureaucracy behaves. It actually strikes me as a sign of weakness, if not paranoia, that he feels he needs to constantly overturn the apple cart,” he said.
‘This happens over and over again’
Miao’s downfall comes less than a year after former defense minister Li Shangfu was removed from the CMC.
The powerful body had six members – all deemed as Xi’s loyalists – serving under the top leader when he began his unprecedented third term two years ago. If Miao is also removed, it would leave two vacant seats.
Shih, the expert on Chinese elite politics, said many dictators, from former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to Mao, have eventually turned against their own proteges.
“Once all of their real competitors are gone, a dictator can never think to themselves: ‘Oh well, all the threats are gone. I can just relax.’ Because they always think that new threats could emerge, including from people who once were very close to them. This happens over and over again,” he said.
As a result, the dictator is always looking for increasingly subtle signs that someone is plotting against them, said Shih, the author of “Coalitions of the Weak,” which examines Mao’s hold on power in the late stage of his life.
During Mao’s last years, he turned against Lin Biao, his longtime protege, former defense minister and heir apparent, accusing him of plotting a coup.
“This kind of dynamic will become increasingly severe as Xi Jinping gets older, as his health is not as robust as previously. His sensitivity to signs of potential challenge to his power will also become keener over time,” Shih said.
For now, the top leader appears determined to carry on his crusade against corruption and disloyalty.
Earlier this month, Xi inspected the PLA’s Information Support Force with his four remaining loyalists on the CMC.
“We must ensure the troops remain absolutely loyal, absolutely pure and absolutely reliable,” Xi told an audience of note-taking officers.
